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Most empirical policy work requires the aggregation of policies. Trade policy aggregation exemplifies
the aggregation problem poignantly, with thousands of highly dispersed trade barriers. This paper
provides methods of policy aggregation that are consistent with two common objectives of empirical
work. One is to preserve real income. The other is to preserve the real volume of activity in the parts
of the economy being aggregated. Both objectives must be achieved for consistent multi-country policy
modeling. An application to India shows that the standard atheoretic method of aggregation overstates
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james.anderson.1@bc.eduAggregation of policy variables is unavoidable in empirical work. Data limitations and 
computational burdens dictate that extremely detailed policies must be combined into 
summary indexes. The focus of this paper is on trade policy aggregation, a particularly 
poignant form of the problem,
1 but the discussion applies to other policy aggregation 
problems as well. The dirty little secret of trade policy empirical work is that atheoretic 
policy aggregation contaminates the results. How much could not previously be even 
guessed at because no consistent aggregation concept existed against which to measure 
standard practice.  
This paper develops aggregation methods that are consistent with two common 
intermediate objectives of empirical work: to preserve the relationship between the policy 
and real income and to preserve the relationship between the policy and the real volume 
of activities in sectors of the economy that are relevant to the purpose of the work. An 
application of the methods of this paper to evaluation of Indian trade policy shows that 
aggregation bias is large. 
“Getting the policy wedges right” is important for getting real income right, as 
suggested by intuition based on dead weight loss triangles: the loss is roughly 
proportional to the square of the policy wedge. Reasoning developed below shows that 
                                                 
1 Tariffs are typically levied on some 10,000 product lines, and are discriminatory 
across some 200 countries. It is infeasible to build disaggregated models at the level of 
the 2 million categories implied by the tariff line data, particularly since information on 
production and consumption is only available at much higher levels of aggregation. 
Aggregation up to a level consistent with the available information on production and 
consumption allows modeling to take advantage of the detailed information on 
protection, while using the available information on production and consumption.   2
the aggregated wedges are too small by significant amounts, so welfare effects are too 
small in absolute value.  
Getting the policy wedges right is also important for getting trade volume and 
domestic economic activity right. The wedges act on volume directly through the 
substitution effect and indirectly through the income effect. In simulation models the bias 
is difficult to determine a priori because there are offsetting effects in general 
equilibrium. In econometric models, the bias is unknown, since it depends on the 
correlation between the aggregation error and the dependent variables of the analysis. 
Low or negative correlation between consistent and standard aggregates is sometimes 
plausible, which suggests substantial bias.  
The aggregation methods of this paper supply the right aggregate wedges for 
getting real income right and a different set of correct aggregate wedges for getting 
sectoral volumes right. These two distinct aggregates are required for both policy 
simulation models and econometric models. Using the methods, investigators can 
consistently aggregate tariffs or tariff equivalents of quotas from the thousands of lines 
found in the tariff data to the dozens of separate lines used in standard policy simulation 
models or the hundreds of lines (sometimes) used in econometric models of trade flows. 
The exposition concentrates on tariffs, noting the changes needed to treat the tariff 
equivalents of quotas in an appendix. 
Consistent aggregation is only possible within a restrictive class of model 
structures. Start from a multi-good multi-country representative agent general equilibrium 
model with convex structure. All problems due to the heterogeneous response of   3
individual agents to specific policies are thus assumed away.
2  Even so, without 
separability in preferences and technology, consistent aggregation with respect to prices 
or quantities is impossible, as Leontief and others showed long ago. Assuming 
separability and homotheticity at the lower level of aggregation, two (or multi-) stage 
budgeting characterizes both demand and supply. Exact aggregate price indexes can then 
be defined that maintain consistency with exact aggregate quantities.
3 These enter the 
simulation or econometric model as if the indexes characterized single goods. While the 
separable setup is highly restrictive, it includes most applied general equilibrium models. 
Section 1 presents the basic description of the economy. 
Consistent tariff aggregation is developed starting in Section 2 with the small 
country case where world prices are constant. The aggregation problem with respect to 
real income is to aggregate tariffs on a product group (e.g., clothing) over its member 
product varieties (e.g., men’s shirts, men’s trousers) such that real income is preserved in 
the general equilibrium of the economy. The aggregation problem with respect to trade 
volume is to aggregate tariffs such that group trade volume is preserved in the general 
equilibrium. The procedure developed below utilizes two indexes. The trade weighted 
average tariff  is needed to get tariff revenue right and hence to get real income right. The 
‘true average tariff’
4 is needed to get the volume of activities right for given real income.  
                                                 
2 See Blundell and Stoker (2005) for a good survey of work on the heterogeneous 
agents problem. 
3 See for example Diewert (1981). 
4 Anderson and Neary (2005) use this term, by analogy with the ‘true cost of 
living index’.   4
The true average tariff is the tariff aggregator that consistently generates 
aggregate trade volume and aggregate prices in the separable product group at given real 
income. The concept is familiar, from index number theory, but it is not consistent with 
general equilibrium real income unless combined in the model with the trade weighted 
average tariff  in exactly the right way shown below.  
Bach and Martin (2001) first called attention to the problem of consistent sectoral 
tariff aggregation in general equilibrium. Their solution was to use a revenue constant 
uniform tariff along with the true average tariff (which they called the tariff aggregator 
for expenditure) as the basis of a compensating variation approach to consistent 
aggregation. While the Bach and Martin approach works for welfare analysis in a single 
country model, they point out that it breaks down in a global model because global 
payments do not balance. This paper solves the global balance problem along with the 
problem of preserving real income with a readily operational method. 
With the methods of this paper, both the true and trade weighted sectoral tariff 
averages are required to consistently determine real income. In contrast, the Trade 
Restrictiveness Index  of Anderson and Neary (2005) preserves real income in shifting 
from the actual vector of tariffs to a single uniform welfare equivalent tariff.
5 This 
suggests a relationship between the welfare equivalent uniform tariff on the one hand and 
the pair of tariff averages used here, an issue explored below.  
                                                 
5 Their focus is mainly on an overall TRI, but they also apply it to a separable 
product group: the uniform tariff on all members of the group that yields in equilibrium 
the same real income as the differentiated tariff structure of clothing.   5
In a broader context, the paper is related to Goulder and Williams (2003). They 
propose an approximation to the measurement of excess burden in general equilibrium 
that improves on the standard Harberger triangle while avoiding the heavy information 
requirements of the theoretically correct formula. By taking account of substitution 
between leisure and the good subject to tax reform, much of the general equilibrium 
impact of the tax reform can be captured and added to the Harberger triangle. Moreover, 
the bias from standard practice is substantial. Similarly, this paper argues that imposing 
separability permits operational trade policy aggregates to be constructed that improve on 
the atheoretic aggregates that are commonly used, and that the bias from standard 
practice is substantial. 
Section 3 analyzes an interdependent world economy comprised of two 
countries.
6 General economic equilibrium requires market clearance, with the mechanism 
of adjustment being world prices. The supply side of the model is simplified to a 
Ricardian technology within each sector to be aggregated. With separability on the 
demand side there is a natural price aggregate in terms of world prices for each product 
group. The same tariff aggregation methods apply as in Section 2.  Domestic price 
aggregates are wedged away from the world price aggregate by the consistent tariff 
aggregator. The consistent aggregator for trade volume purposes is the true average tariff. 
A key contribution of this paper is to provide a consistent conversion of  aggregated trade 
volume measured in internally consistent units (utilizing the true average tariff) into 
aggregated trade volume measured in externally consistent units (utilizing both the true 
                                                 
6 The extension to more countries is cumbersome but the principles are the same.  
   6
average tariff and the trade weighted average tariff). This conversion is necessary for 
global modeling in which world markets must clear and global payments must balance. 
The methods of this paper evade an existence or uniqueness problem that arises 
with aggregation using the TRI in the large country case. Anderson and Neary (2005, 
Chapter 9) and Dakhlia and Temimi (2006) note that the TRI may not exist in the large 
country case and where it exists it need not be unique. Essentially, the present methods, 
by using two different indexes, are able to get both the domestic price aggregate (and 
hence quantity aggregate, the trade volume) right and the tariff revenue right (and hence 
real income right). In contrast, the uniform welfare equivalent tariff (the TRI) is subject 
to the tension between the revenue (and hence real income) effects of terms of trade 
changes and the real income effect of higher tariffs at constant terms of trade, hence the 
single welfare equivalent uniform tariff may not be able to get both right in the large 
country case. 
Section 4 presents an application to India in 1991 and 2004 using a simple 
computable general equilibrium model of India and the rest of the world. Tariffs at the 4 
digit level for 1991 (around 1200 items) and 6 digit level for 2004 (around 5500 items) 
are aggregated to form two composites, final goods imports and intermediate goods 
imports. Aggregation bias is large, using trade weighted as opposed to consistently 
aggregated tariffs overstates real income for India by nearly 1%. More significantly, 
aggregation bias is very large relative to the gains from liberal trade. For this comparison 
it is necessary to control for the terms of trade effect.  Simulating the effects of unilateral 
free trade for India at constant world prices using both trade weighted and consistent 
aggregation shows that the gain is understated by a factor ranging from 4 (in 1991) to 50   7
(in 2004).   Alternatively scaled, the initial overstatement of real income is around 3 
times the global gains from multilateral free trade. The bias results from the dispersion of 
the underlying tariffs that pushes apart the true average tariff and the trade weighed 
average tariff. Cutting the dispersion in half still leaves considerable bias, with the 
estimates converging only as the dispersion of the tariff structure disappears.  
Section 5 examines the relationship between the various tariff aggregates, with 
emphasis on the role of dispersion in connecting the TRI (the real income equivalent 
aggregator) to the trade weighted average tariff. Section 6 concludes. 
Appendix A examines policy aggregation with quotas. Appendix B sets out 
details of the application to India in 1991. An appendix available on request provides 
further guidance for policy modelers who may apply the methods advocated in this 
paper.
7 
                                                 
7 The treatment steps through the creation of true average and trade weighted 
average tariffs at the sectoral level and their input into the global trade simulation model. 
Then consistent aggregation is illustrated with a very simple 2 country global trade model 
(even simpler than the India application) that has the virtue of permitting a decomposition 
of the effects of trade reform into efficiency effects and terms of trade effects. Here too, 
the real income loss due to protection using consistent aggregation is more than three 
times the real income loss estimated using trade weighted average sectoral tariffs.  
   8
1. The Basic Model 
Trade policy affects the domestic price vectors of tradable goods (p,π) relative 
to a non-taxed numeraire good. The vector of goods with price vector p is to be 
aggregated consistently. In the background, the equilibrium prices of nontraded goods 
and factors are determined by market clearance as functions of the prices of traded goods 
and real income u, as explained further below. World prices are given by (p
W,π
W ) 
where the bar denotes that these prices are constant by the small country assumption. In 
Section 3 the bar is removed and world prices become endogenous. Domestic prices are 
wedged away from world prices by a vector of trade taxes or subsidies,  p − p
W,π −π
W .   
The trade expenditure function summarizes demand and supply behavior of the 
representative agent economy. Trade expenditure E(p,π,u) is the difference between the 
expenditure function e(p,π,u) and the gross domestic product function g(p,π), each 
function having standard properties. The excess demand vectors are equal to 
Ep = ep − gp and Eπ = eπ − gπ , by Shephard’s and Hotelling’s Lemmas. Trade tax 
revenue is given by (p − p
W )'Ep + (π −π
W )'Eπ . Assume for simplicity that the only 
source of tax or subsidy activity comes on traded goods. No essential qualitative 
difference arises from this simplification: the aggregation problem remains the same 
when nontraded goods and factors are taxed.
8 
                                                 
8 The policy aggregation problem for nontraded goods and factor taxes resembles 
that for trade policies and will have very similar solutions. It is perhaps less ubiquitous a 
problem because nontraded goods and factor taxes appear to be less highly differentiated   9
The equilibrium level of real income is determined by the international budget 
constraint, the value of imports at world prices cannot exceed the value of exports at 
world prices by more than the given international transfer b. The international budget 
constraint is conveniently rewritten as:  
  B(p,π,u; p
W,π
W ) ≡ E(p,π,u)− (p − p
W )'Ep − (π −π
W )'Eπ − b ≤ 0. (1.1) 
The middle expression sets out the structure of the balance of trade function, 
B(p,π,u; p
W,π
W,b). The equilibrium condition is 
  B(p,π,u; p
W,π
W,b) = 0. 
Real income u is determined by trade policies and world prices using all the 
information embedded in the above reduced form equation. In general, no aggregation of 
the prices and trade policies of the p group can do the job. Also, the determination of 
trade volumes eπ − gπ  and ‘market access’  p
W '(ep − gp) for given real income requires 
all the details of the dependence of ep − gp on the vector p. In contrast, in the special case 
of separability, consistent aggregation is possible. 
Specifically, the set of goods with prices  p are assumed to enter preferences or 
production separably (weak separability is assumed) and homothetically (at the lower 
level of the separable preferences). Thus the price aggregator φ(p), concave and 
homogeneous of degree one in  p, enters either as a preference aggregator (gφ = 0 ) or a 
technology aggregator (eφ = 0), with the latter representing either outputs (exports) or 
inputs (imported intermediates).  Besides the traded goods, each country produces a 
                                                                                                                                                 
than trade taxes. The appearance may be deceptive, however, because income tax codes 
in many OECD countries are complex.   10
vector of nontraded goods with price vector h. In the background, the gross domestic 
product function embeds the nontraded primary factors  of production. 
The trade expenditure function is defined by  
  E[φ(p),π,u]≡ max
h e[δφ(p),π,h,u]− g[(1−δ)φ(p),π,h], 
where h is the price vector of nontraded goods and δ  is equal to either zero or one 
depending on whether the tariffs being aggregated are either intermediate goods or final 
goods. Note that the first order condition is implied by market clearance for nontraded 
goods while the concavity of e-g guarantees a unique global maximum. While the trade 
expenditure function pushes nontraded goods into the background, it remains concave 
and homogeneous of degree one in the traded goods prices and retains separability.   
Note that this setup imposes the Armington assumption: domestically produced 
traded goods are not perfect substitutes for domestic products consumed at home. On top 
of this, it imposes two levels of separability --- between product class i and all other 
product classes, and between domestic and all imported varieties of product class i. To 
illustrate, this means that domestic peanuts (with a price that enters the vector π ) are a 
different good from imported peanuts (with price vector  p covering the varieties of 
peanuts imported from all the other countries in the world).
9  The imperfect substitutes 
assumption is ubiquitous in empirical work because the perfect substitutes case yields 
predictions that are wildly far from the observable trade patterns. The extra restriction of 
                                                 
9 Manole and Martin (2006) point out that this setup is more restrictive than 
Armington’s original assumptions where there is a single CES aggregator over domestic 
and imported goods.    11
separability is widely used in computable general equilibrium models. This separability 
also permits consistent aggregation.
10 
By assumption, the price aggregator φ  will consistently yield the correct trade 
volumes for given levels of real income. Thus, by Shephard’s Lemma, the trade vector 
for the unaggregated goods is given by Eπ(φ,π,u) while the aggregate volume of trade 
for the p group is given by Eφ(φ,π,u). The individual volumes within the p group are 
given by Eφφp . Note, however, that the balance of trade function defined by the left hand 
side of (1.1) does not similarly reduce its dependence on p to the price aggregator φ .  
2. Trade Policy Aggregation 
Let T
a  denote the trade weighted (on the domestic price base) average tariff: 
T
a ≡ wiTi
i ∑  where Ti ≡ (pi − pi
W )/pi and wi ≡ piEpi / piEpi
i ∑ . Let T
δ  denote the ‘true 
average tariff’ defined by  
                                                 
10 It may be possible to relax the aggregation restrictions somewhat, but this must 
await further work. To see the issue involved, suppose that one element of p was an 
argument of the gross domestic product function while still appearing in the expenditure 
function aggregator φ . Try to work through the various steps taken below to achieve 
consistent aggregation, and notice that it is not possible. Bach and Martin show that a 
closed form solution is feasible for the CES case but not for their tariff revenue 
aggregator. 
How much bias is due to imposing separability on various non-separable 




The true average tariff, applied to the world price vector, yields the same aggregate 
volume of trade as the actual differentiated tariff vector. 
The balance of trade constraint can be consistently solved for real income in terms 
of (T
a,T







W )'Eπ = b. (2.1) 
This equation follows from (1.1) using the implications of separability:  
Eφφp'(p − p
W ) = Eφφ(p)T
a  where T
a = φpi(p)piTi /φ
i ∑ (p) and φ(p) =φ(p
W )/( 1−T
δ).  
  The trade volume function is given by the derivative of E with respect to φ , Eφ. 
A very important subtlety is that this aggregate is in terms of quantity units that apply 
internally to the home economy. Externally, the appropriate quantity units for import 
volume in a world market clearance equation are in terms of world prices.
11 It is 













δ), the foreign export volume 
evaluated with the average home markup must be equal to the domestic expenditure on 







φ(φ,π) ≡ eφφ / e.
 
                                                 
11 A more technical treatment helps to clarify the issue. The definition of the 
expenditure function in the separable homothetic case yields 
e(p,π)u = min
x,z {p'x +π'z |ψ(x,z) ≥ u} = min
y,z {φy+π'z |ψ[ f(x),z]≥ u} = e(φ,π)u. 
Here y = f(x) is the quantity aggregator for domestic purposes, dual to the price 
aggregator φ(p). In world markets, however, the quantities in the vector x must be 
aggregated with world relative prices. In the perfect substitutes case of our applications, 
the quantity at world prices is a simple (unweighted) sum and the world price value is the 
product of that sum and the single world price for the aggregate.   13
Notice that the aggregators (T
a,T
δ) can be calculated in a preliminary step, 
independently of the rest of the general equilibrium structure. This is a great advantage 
when some 10,000 tariffs are to be aggregated into a few dozen indexes. 
Insight into why consistent aggregation requires two tariff indexes follows from 
the analytics of small tariff reforms. Differentiating the right hand side of (1.1) with 
respect to p and using the properties of the balance of trade function (for more details see 
Anderson and Neary, 2005) yields 
 
μ
−1Eudu = (p − p
W )'Eppdp + (π −π
W )'Eπ pdp where
μ = 1− (p − p
W )'Epu / Eu − (π −π
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Notice that both the true average tariff (represented by dφ and by the φ  argument of the 
share and derivative functions) and the trade weighted average tariff are required for a 
consistent analysis. The former is required because of its influence on the change in trade 
volume and the latter is required because it controls how that change in trade volume 
changes tariff revenue.  
Relation to the TRI Aggregator 
It is helpful to relate the consistent aggregation proposed above to the sectoral 
TRI aggregator previously proposed by Anderson and Neary. Let the TRI uniform tariff 
factor be given by 1+τ





W ) = B(p,π,u; p
W,π
W ) = b. (2.2) 
See Anderson and Neary (2005) for details.    14




uniform tariff equivalent factor on the foreign price base is given by 1+τ
Δ =1/( 1−T
Δ). 









Computation of the TRI uniform tariff for each sector to be aggregated remains 
computationally burdensome in that it must be calculated using the full general 
equilibrium structure, even as simplified by the assumption of separability. The 
computationally simpler alternative developed here takes further advantage of 
separability.  
A Concrete Example 
The implications of consistent aggregation are usefully illustrated by a concrete 
example (further developed and simulated in an appendix available on request
12).  The 
relationship of the TRI to the true and trade weighted average tariffs is cleanly illustrated 
by the example. 
Suppose that the tariff ridden group to be aggregated is a final goods group while 
the only other tariffs are on final goods as well. The upper level expenditure function is 
Cobb-Douglas with parametric share parameters s
j . The lower level expenditure 
function is a homogeneous of degree one and concave function φ(p), such as the CES 
function. The budget constraint combined with the expenditure function assumption 
implies that:  
                                                 









































π . (2.3) 
Notice that both the true average tariff and the trade weighted average tariff (on the 
domestic price base) are needed to correctly solve the model for real income. The TRI 
uniform tariff is implicitly a function of these same two indexes in (2.3). 
As for trade volume, eφ  is the volume at internal prices. For use in a global model 






W  in order to 




W = g + b. This conversion is irrelevant for the small country, but it is 
crucial in a global model. 
The method of aggregation extends straightforwardly to any number of separable 
groups to be aggregated. In terms of the Cobb-Douglas upper level example presented 
previously, think of each π j as a composite price index similar to φ . The analyst 
typically imposes separability for groups such as clothing, food, consumer durables, and 
the like. Similarly on the intermediate goods demand structure one might impose 
separability on energy products, metal products and so forth. This may be less plausible 
than on the final demand side. 
The method of aggregation also extends straightforwardly to any separable 
homothetic preferences at the upper level. The parametric shares such as s
φ  become   16
functions s
φ(φ,π) with functional forms given by such well-known structures as the CES 
or the translog. 
Finally, the method of aggregation extends straightforwardly to tariffs on 
intermediate inputs, assuming that these enter the gross domestic product function 
separably. (Separability is a very strong restriction on the underlying technology.)                                           
Intermediate input demand is given by −gφφp . The equilibrium nominal expenditure is 
given by e = [g + b − (gφφ)T
a]/( 1− s
π 'T





W /φ(p). Real income  is given by e / π
s
i
i ∏ . 
Non-separable Structures 
What can be done if separability does not obtain? In that case there is no 
consistent aggregation. How much error is caused by the failure of consistent 
aggregation? This can only be determined by simulation analysis of a (set of) maintained 
non-separable structures relative to an erroneously imposed separable structure. By 
analogy with bootstrapping, draw random shocks to the maintained equilibrium system 
and compare the results of the true equilibrium with the approximation when separability 
is erroneously imposed. Separability is inescapable, but some sense of the error it entails 
might one day be part of reporting simulation results. 
3. The Global Economy 
A similar characterization of the foreign economy gives rise to functions and 
variables denoted with a *. Each economy distorts its domestic relative prices away from   17
world prices (p
w,π
w) using border taxes or subsidies on either exports or imports. There 
is a vector of untaxed goods with price vector r.  
For simplicity, the goods to be aggregated are supplied by the foreign economy 
only. In scaling this assumption up for many countries and goods, the vector of exported 
goods to be aggregated is differentiated from the goods produced for sale in the home 
market and also from goods produced in the export market --- the Armington assumption. 
The general equilibrium of the economies is described by a system of two balance 
of trade conditions and four subsystems of market clearing equations: 
 
E(φ,π,r,u)− (p − p
w)'Eφφp − (π −π





































Separable structure in either final or imported input demand is imposed by the 
notation Eφ and this demand is supplied from the foreign economy only. The last two 
subsystems of market clearance equations do not impose this separable structure on the 
other taxed goods and the untaxed goods denoted by the subscript r. 
Consistent aggregation in a global model requires a further restriction on supply. 
The simplest case arises when relative supply prices (the vector p
W ) are independent of 
trade policies. A Ricardian technology among the goods to be aggregated is sufficient, as 
was the small country assumption of the preceding section. Weaker supply side 
separability assumptions (see below) will also permit aggregation though posing a small 
added computational burden.    18
The preceding section shows that the true average tariff is the consistent aggregate 
for trade volumes given real incomes while in combination with the trade weighted 
average tariff in the balance of trade function it provides the consistent aggregate for real 
incomes. The analyst needs two aggregate wedges for each country, based on which the 
aggregated model can be solved. The methods of the preceding section reveal how to 
calculate the aggregate wedges for given world prices. These wedges can be inserted into 
the multi-country general equilibrium model above. The solution will generate a vector of 
world prices, including an aggregate price for the p group.  
Notice that the two balance of trade equations and the system of market clearance 
equations for the π  goods require only the price aggregates φ(p
W ) = φ
W  evaluated at 




























































W  along with real 
incomes (u,u
*) as functions of the trade policy aggregators (the trade weighted average 
tariff and the true average tariff) for each country.  
The fourth and fifth equation systems represent the implications of the 
separability assumption applied to the aggregates. First, each country’s excess demand is 
met from the other country’s supply only, with the notation Eφ denoting either final or   19
intermediate input demand. φ
W  denotes the world supply price of the aggregated good 
sold into the home market.  
Supply Side Separability  
The preceding aggregation scheme allows no relative price changes on the supply 
side in the group being aggregated. If this is false, then in applying simulation models to 
trade reform, a potential inconsistency arises between the initial wedges T
δ,T
a and the 
equilibrium generated from the aggregated model. The initial world price vector  p
W 0 
used to form the wedges may not be proportional to the equilibrium price vector  p
W1, 
causing shifts in the appropriate tariff aggregators.  
Under a commonly used restriction in applied general equilibrium modeling, there 
is a simple solution. Suppose that the supply side is separable such that in the foreign 
economy a price aggregator η(p
*) exists. η is increasing, convex, homogeneous of 
degree one and differentiable in the price vector  p
*. A sufficient condition is for the 
goods in the aggregate to be jointly produced.
13 The general equilibrium of production 
implies that the gross domestic product function is increasing and convex in η, reflecting 
the increasing opportunity cost of resources used to produce the joint product. 
Market clearance of the home country’s imported goods in the disaggregated 
model requires:  






* = 0. 
Trade reform changes elements of the tariff schedule and this causes changes in the world 
                                                 
13 Previously, the assumption was that η was a Leontief function (reflecting 
infinitely elasticity of transformation among the members of the group).   20





*δ) based on initial relative prices. These changes in world prices and the 
associated changes in disaggregated shares lead the aggregated model to be inconsistent 
with the ‘true’ outcomes. In principle it is possible to achieve consistency iteratively by 
using the market clearing sub-aggregate module above to update the shares used to 
calculate the tariff aggregates. Alternatively, it may be possible to develop simulation-
based evidence that the share change problem is unimportant. 
More generality than this means that no consistent aggregation is possible. 
Nevertheless, it may be possible to develop some bounds on the inaccuracy of ‘consistent 
aggregation’ of the type explored here. 
4. Application 
India in 1991 and 2004 had relatively high tariffs on average, and notably high 
dispersion of tariffs, especially in 1991. This assessment does not reflect India’s 
important liberalization of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) between 1991 and 2004 except 
insofar as the rise in tariffs replaces highly restrictive NTBs with less restrictive tariffs.  
Table 1 summarizes the picture with trade weighted average tariffs, true average tariffs 
and the coefficient of variation of (trade-weighted) tariffs for final goods and 
intermediate goods. The source data uses trade weighted average tariffs and imports for 
1991 at the 4 digit CCCN level (the predecessor to the 4 digit Harmonized System 
classification), and at the 6 digit HS level for 2004.
14 Data are taken from TRAINS with 
subsequent manipulation by the author. The true average tariff is calculated based on a 
CES aggregator with elasticity of substitution equal to 5. 
Table 1. Tariff Indexes for India, 1991 and 2004 
  Intermediate Goods  Final Goods 
  T
a   T
δ   CV  T
a   T
δ   CV 
                                                 
14 This procedure suppresses tariff line dispersion at a still lower level as well as 
cross-country variation in tariffs due to trade preferences, presumptively biasing 
downward the measure of aggregation bias reported below.   21
2004  .170  .185 .421 .212  .307 .687 
1991 .122  .218 1.351 .208  .269  .713 
The model used to simulate various policy experiments is that of Anderson and 
Neary (2005) extended to a two country world. See Appendix C for further details here. 
There is an aggregate export good produced by each country. On the importer’s side of 
the market the aggregate export is broken into many forms resulting in the 4 or 6 digit 
flows of final and intermediate goods imports. (There are around 600 goods in each 
category at the 4 digit level, with the classification followed by Anderson and Neary, 
2005. There are around 2800 goods in each category at the 6 digit level.) Each country 
also produces a nontraded good jointly with the exported good with a Constant Elasticity 
of Transformation (CET) technology. The level of activity that feeds into the CET 
technology is produced by a CES technology that uses a single primary factor (labor) and 
a composite imported intermediate input. On the demand side of each economy there is a 
CES expenditure function that allocates expenditure between the nontraded good and the 
composite final import. Finally, the composite imports, both final and intermediate, are 
CES aggregates of the 4 digit disaggregated imports.  
The parameters of the model are the various elasticities, the distribution or share 
parameters, the supplies of the primary factor for each country, the tariffs and the 
international transfer. The distribution parameters are benchmarked to 1991 or 2004 trade 
and national income accounts data, as are the labor supplies. The assumed values of the 
elasticities are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Assumed Elasticities 
 Demand  Joint  Supply  Production 
Upper Level  2  2  0.7 
Lower Level  5  ---  5 
The rest of the world is highly simplified to a single country, Rest of World 
(ROW). In 1991 the ROW has a uniform 5% tariff (on the foreign price base), set up to 
export the amount that India imports in total (in external prices). In 2004, it was possible 
to construct ROW tariffs facing India from TRAINS data using the World Bank’s WITS 
software. All results for India turn out to be quite insensitive to the level of ROW tariffs.   22
All the action in the simulations comes from trade reform in India. Unilateral free 
trade, free trade in final goods and free trade in intermediate goods are simulated. A final 
simulation benchmarks the results by comparison with multilateral free trade. The chief 
virtue of the model is its focus on the consequences of the dispersion of tariffs, a matter 
that is essentially swept under the rug with the standard CGE modeling method of using 
trade weighted average tariffs everywhere. The results from 1991 and 2004 for India 
provide two examples of aggregation bias based on high dispersion tariff structures that 
differ significantly from each other.  
India’s 1991 GDP comprised about 1% of world GDP, rising to around 1.7% by 
2004. Nevertheless, the structure of the model implies that no country is small; it is the 
only source of its exports to the rest of the world. Thus there are important terms of trade 
consequences of tariff reform that can offset or swamp the efficiency effects.  
Table 3 presents the results of several policy simulations. The cell entries are 
indexes of India’s real income under the various scenarios.    23
 
Table 3. India’s Real Income and Trade Policy, 1991 and 2004 
 1991  2004 
Initial Conditions 
Consistent Aggregation  .8931  .9598 
Sectoral T
a  Aggregation  .9008 .9687 
Unilateral Free Trade Experiments 
Free Trade  .8900  .9353 
Final Trade  .8961 .9597
Intermediate Trade  .8866 .9341
Free Trade at Constant 
World Prices 
.9009 .9717 
Multilateral Free Trade 
India’s real income index  .8967  .9436 
The experiments reported in Table 3 provide the basis for analyzing the importance of 
aggregation bias relative to the gains from unilateral free trade for India. Table 4 collects 
several ways of scaling the aggregation bias that are illuminating. The most important 
conclusion to draw from the table is that the bias from using inconsistent aggregation is 
large.  
Table 4. Aggregation Bias for India 
 1991  2004 
Per cent of Real Income  0.86%  0.93% 
Multiple of Gains from Free 
Trade, constant world prices 
0.75 0.98 
Multiple of Global Gains 
from Free Trade 
2.5 3.2 
 
The first row scales the aggregation bias (the difference between the first and second 
rows of Table 3) by national income. For 1991, the bias is 0.86% of national income, 
rising in 2004 to 0.93% of real income. The next two rows of Table 4 relate the 
aggregation bias to the gains from free trade. In doing so, it is necessary to control in   24
some appropriate way for the effect of terms of trade changes. In the second row, the 
model is solved for equilibrium
15 with the world prices of India’s imports and exports 
frozen (the small country case). Aggregation bias ranges from 75% to 98% of the 
efficiency gains from unilateral free trade for India. More dramatically, the efficiency 
gains inconsistently measured from the trade weighted average base are only 1/4 as large 
as the true gains in 1991 and only 1/50 as large as the true gains in 2004. The third row 
nets out the terms of trade effect by imposing a utilitarian global welfare function, equal 
to u + u
*. For this comparison it is also more relevant to simulate multilateral free trade 
(to damp down the terms of trade effects). For 2004, the aggregation bias is 3.2 times the 
global gains from multilateral free trade. For 1991, the aggregation bias is 2.5 times the 
global gains. 
The second conclusion to draw from the simulations is that terms of trade effects 
are important. India has higher tariffs than the rest of the world, with cuts in these tariffs 
generating negative terms of trade effects that are large enough to offset the positive 
efficiency effect that is isolated in the sixth row of Table 3. Even going to multilateral 
free trade does not help much, and in fact India loses in 2004 while achieving a modest 
gain in 1991. The size of the terms of trade effect may be too large due to the 
assumptions of the model. (The ROW has an elasticity of supply of exports essentially 
equal to elasticity of transformation due to the CET structure of the model acting in 
combination with the tiny share that exports to India form of the ROW production.)  
The decomposition of the liberalization into final and intermediate goods tariffs in 
Table 3 reveals that a cut in the higher tariff, on the more elastically demanded good, will 
raise real income even though it has negative terms of trade effects. In contrast, unilateral 
free trade in intermediates cuts the lower average tariffs to zero on the inelastically 
demanded good. This has negative efficiency effects as well as negative terms of trade 
effects. These results illustrate a well-known principle of gradual trade reform. At given 
terms of trade, real income changes in proportion to t'dm where t is the vector of 
specific tariffs and dm is the compensated change in the vector of imports. It is desirable 
                                                 
15 The solution method allows for changing prices of nontraded goods and factors 
as well as real income following the policy change.   25
to raise elements of  m where the tariff is largest, and to have the largest increases in m 
be associated with the largest tariffs. So, to raise real income, cut high tariffs, especially 
where the demand is relatively elastic. Reversing this pattern will lower income. 
The chart presents the real income simulation results of an arithmetic mean 
preserving contraction of the dispersion of tariffs, applied separately to the final and 
intermediate tariff schedules for India in 1991.  The formula is given by 
T




∑ / n + (1− λ)T
0  where ι is the vector of ones, λ ∈[0,1] and the initial tariff 
vector is T
0 . (Because the weights in the trade weighted average tariff change, it is 
difficult to specify a mean preserving cut in dispersion using T
a  as the mean.) 
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The effect of this formula on the trade weighted average tariffs is to raise the 
intermediate tariff (on the domestic price base) from 12.2% to 15.5% while lowering the 
final goods tariff from 20.8% to 11.0%.  This improves real income due to the 
mechanism discussed above in considering the move to free trade in final and 
intermediate goods separately. However, there is another important mechanism at work   26
as well: the contraction of dispersion improves efficiency. The consistent aggregation 
method picks up this effect while the trade weighted average method misses it entirely. 
The gap between the two lines in the chart represents the bias due to inconsistent 
aggregation when the underlying trade policy includes important changes in dispersion. 
Essentially similar results obtain for India in 2004. 
The appendix presents simulations of a different hypothetical world trade model 
with simpler structure and made up numbers. The simpler model eliminates nontraded 
goods and factors in order to more precisely separate terms of trade effects from 
efficiency effects and in order to see how much difference asymmetry of country size 
makes. Moreover, the number of tariff lines and their dispersion in the India/ROW model 
makes it difficult to get a feel for how dispersion drives the results.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
It is useful to consider the sensitivity of results to changes in a few key 
parameters. First of all, different assumed values of elasticities might be expected to 
make a big difference. Obviously the CES aggregator for import composites is sensitive 
to the elasticity parameter. Since the elasticity drives the difference between the true 
average tariff and the trade weighted average tariff, it will drive the difference in real 
income effects of tariff changes due to inconsistent aggregation. In contrast, the other 
‘macro-economic’ elasticities have an unknown effect on the effect of inconsistent 
aggregation. A second assumption we test below is the sensitivity of the model to the 
closure involving international transfers. 
The effect of the elasticity on the tariff aggregates of the 1991 data is shown the 
chart below. Essentially similar results obtain for 2004. The benchmark results used 
elasticity equal to 5. At elasticity equal to 0, the trade weighted average tariff is equal to 
the true average tariff.   27














Now consider the effect on trade policy reforms of raising the elasticity to 8. (This 
is an elasticity commonly found in gravity model investigations of cross section trade.) 
Table 4 replicates the 1991 portion of Table 3 at the new elasticity value. The bias due to 
use of trade weighted average tariffs rises to 1.32% of national income. Notice that at the 
higher elasticity, unilateral free trade does pay; the efficiency effects (due basically to the 
difference between the trade weighted average and true average tariffs) dominate the 
terms of trade effect. 
Table 4. India’s 1991 Real Income and Trade Policy (Elasticity = 8) 
Initial Conditions, Consistent Aggregation  .8891 
Initial Conditions,  sectoral T
a  aggregation  .9008 
Unilateral Free Trade  .8900 
Unilateral Free Final Trade .8929
Unilateral Intermediate Free Trade .8859
Multilateral Free Trade  .8967 
 
  Now consider the effect of changes in the other elasticities on the estimate of real 
income. The bottom line is that aggregation bias is rather insensitive to the upper level 
elasticities.   28
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  Finally, consider the treatment of international transfers. The benchmark model 
treats the apparent international transfer (the current account surplus plus an inferred net 
services balance) as fixed in nominal terms. The net transfer is a couple of percent of   29
GDP, so the magnitude is non-trivial for India. The alternative tried was to set the 
transfer equal to zero and adjust the apparent consumption expenditure accordingly. The 
effect of doing so made no qualitative difference to the results. 
5. Relationship of Tariff Indexes 
 The application emphasizes the importance of tariff dispersion as the source of 
aggregation bias. Although the TRI is not required to solve global general equilibrium 
trade models, it is a useful diagnostic tool for analyzing the results of trade policies and 
their reform because it collects in a single index number the real income equivalent 
implications of a highly nonlinear function of the other two indexes. There are useful 
relationships between the true average tariff, the trade weighted average tariff and the 
TRI uniform tariff., along with the trade weighted variance of tariffs. 
Unfortunately, the three indexes cannot be ranked except in special cases. See 
Anderson and Neary (2005) for a general discussion. Manole and Martin get a ranking in 
the CES case under an additional intuitive condition. For a self-contained treatment of the 
importance of consistent aggregation, this section reviews (and slightly extends) the 
treatment in Anderson and Neary.   
From standard substitutability considerations, T
δ ≥ T
a. The mix of these two 
indexes in equation (2.1) makes it awkward to use them for analyzing the effect of 
changing tariff structures on welfare. In contrast, the TRI uniform tariff reduces the 
complexity of the tariff schedule to a single index number appearing in the balance of 
trade function. The TRI uniform tariff links straightforwardly to welfare. From Anderson 
and Neary (2005, p. 57), T
Δ ≥ T
δ  if and only if tariff revenue would rise at constant real 
income when replacing the true average tariff with the TRI uniform tariff. There is no   30
general relationship possible between the TRI uniform tariff and the other two 
aggregates, but consideration of the structure of revenue provides more insight. 
In the present model, the difference in tariff revenue evaluated with the two 
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Revenue is rising in T for small values of T, and eventually turns negative, the well 
known Laffer curve. Thus for small values of T, T
δ < T
Δ while for large values of T, 
T
Δ < T
δ .  Note that T /( 1−T) = τ , the uniform tariff on the world price base. The 
critical value of the uniform tariff that separates the rising from the falling portion of the 
Laffer curve is given by τ
c = Eφ /[Eφφφ /( 1−T)], the tariff equal to the inverse of the 
elasticity of demand for the product group. It is plausible that tariff schedules are usually 
located in the rising portion of the Laffer curve, in which case the TRI uniform tariff 
exceeds both of the other tariff indexes.   
Tariff Averages and Variances 
Anderson and Neary (2005) also show that the implications of trade reform for 
welfare can be summarized quite generally in terms of two tariff moments, the 
generalized mean and the generalized variance. The results are stated in terms of small 
changes but suggest that the variance of tariffs has a useful role to play in describing the 
welfare implications of tariff structure.    31























Δ is a positive coefficient, V
a  denotes the trade weighted variance of tariffs, and 
the differentials of the moments are evaluated using fixed weights. This expression shows 
that mean and variance both matter. For the most clean results, suppose that the upper 
level of substitutability is Cobb-Douglas. Then the square bracket term becomes  
  dT
a 1+ C
2 /( 1− eφφ / e) ( )
1/2 {} , 
 
where C ≡ V
1/2 /T
a, the  generalized coefficient of variation of tariffs.  
Practitioners have often calculated the coefficient of variation as a supplement to 
average tariffs in the evaluation of trade policy. This idea was more right than theorists 
had previously believed. Future work may reveal that these differential expressions do 
tolerably well for the smaller changes that typify trade policy. In that case, empirical 
work for some purposes might use the formulae to approximate the behavior of the real 
income equivalent tariff. 
6. Conclusion 
Consistent policy aggregation is feasible when the group to be aggregated enters 
preferences  or technology separably. This paper presents simple operational formulae 
that demonstrate the point. It also provides some simulation evidence to show that the 
aggregation bias problem from inconsistent aggregation is quantitatively significant. 
Future work should apply these methods and more thoroughly examine the biases due to 
inconsistent aggregation as well as some of the shortcuts suggested in the paper for 
simplifying computation. 
                                                 
16 Their equation is in terms of the TRI uniform tariff on the world price base, τ
Δ . 
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This section treats the complications introduced by trade policy in the form of 
quotas, for simplicity returning again to the one country case. 
Trade policies prominently include quotas. The most important of these, the 
Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), was to have ended in January 2005, but pressure from 
the US and EU has extended its restrictions on China. Other quotas are significant in 
agriculture. Thus it is significant to extend consideration of consistent aggregation to 
cover quotas. Where tariff equivalents of individual quotas are available, the techniques 
of the preceding sections can be applied straightforwardly, recognizing that within group 
‘tariff equivalent’ changes must be solved from the submodel that describes 
disaggregated trade in the quota constrained group.  
  Quota evaluation is usually plagued with inadequate information about tariff 
equivalents, a problem that appears to worsen when, as in this paper, the TRI uniform 
tariff is sensitive to the dispersion of the tariff equivalents. More optimism is generated 
by considering an important special case in which, at the margin, quota rent goes entirely 
to the exporter. As Anderson and Neary (1992) emphasize, only some quota rent 
typically accrues to the importer. The MFA for example awards the quota rights to the 
exporters. Tariffs on MFA-constrained categories in the US serve to retain a portion of 
the rent, the remainder going to exporters and importers. In the limit case, all remaining 
rent goes to the exporters (rationalized by their having all the bargaining power).  
For each quota line, assume that there is a rent retaining tariff t
R  and that the rent 
over and above this amount is split with ω  per cent going to foreigners. The unit rent 
retained at home (the tariff equivalent) is given by: 
  t
R + (1−ω)(p − p
W − t
R) = ωt
R + (1−ω)(p − p
W ). 
Now consider the evaluation of trade policy with quotas. The idea is to convert to 
tariff equivalents. The unit rent retained at home takes the place of the specific tariff in 
the balance of trade function. However, the relationship of domestic price to the ‘tariff 
equivalent’ and the world price is different with quotas. The virtual price (equal to the  
equilibrium domestic price with quotas) is given by:   2
  % p = p :Ep(p,π,u) = q. (2.4) 
Here, q is the quota vector. The balance of trade function with tariff equivalents of quotas 
is given by: 
 B( % p,π,u;ω,t
R) = E(% p,π,u)−[ωt
R + (1−ω)( % p − p
W )]'Ep − (π −π
W )'Eπ − b . 
To reduce the quota group to a single tariff, taking advantage of separability, 
requires treating the tariff equivalent just like the tariff vector for the p group in 
preceding sections, forming the trade weighted and true average tariffs on the domestic 
price base.  
Changes in trade policy show up in changes in tariff equivalents that are not 
parametric. Calculation of the new tariff equivalents uses the model linking quotas and 
tariffs π  to domestic prices,  Ep( % p,π,u) = q. See Anderson and Neary (1992, 2005) for 
details. 
In the CES case, the sub-expenditure and sub-utility functions are ‘self-dual’, 
CES functions with the same parameters. This makes for particularly convenient versions 
of  Ep( % p,π,u) = q. 
Appendix B. India and ROW CGE model 
 
The India/ROW model is based on Anderson-Neary (2005), pp 294-303. Assume 
that each country produces a composite export and a non-traded good. It imports a CES 
composite intermediate import and a CES composite final import. The export good is 
effectively produced with Ricardian technology. The joint output technology between 
nontraded good and exports is a CET production frontier. The production of the joint 
output is a CES function of a single primary factor and a CES composite of imported 
inputs. Preferences are CES between the nontraded good and the composite final imports. 
Details of the Model 
The mathematical representation of the model is as follows. Let the CES price 
index for final goods in the home country be given by P(p,h) where p is the final import 
goods price vector and h is the price of the nontraded final good. The equivalent variables   3
for the foreign country are denoted with *. Let the CES cost function for a unit of activity 
be given by C(m,w) where m is the imported intermediate goods price vector and w is 
the wage rate. Let the CET activity price deflator be given by η(h,r) where r is the price 
of the export good. Let z denote a unit of activity.  
The constant returns to scale assumption concerning the technology implies that  
  η(h,r) = C(m,w). (1.1) 
Labor market clearance implies that 
  Cwz = L (1.2) 
where L is the supply of labor. Nontraded goods clearance implies that (using 
Shephard’s Lemma) 
  P hu = ηhz. (1.3) 
The balance of payments constraint implies that 
  P(p,h)u − (p − p
W )'Ppu − (m − m
W )'Cmz − wL = b. (1.4) 
Here, the W superscript denotes the world price of the goods in question. This system of 4 
equations can be solved for the 4 unknowns (h,w,u,z) given the exogenous trade taxes 
and world prices and the exogenous supply of labor L and world transfer b. 
Now consider consistent aggregation. We first of all impose that the world supply 
of the imported goods comes from a technology for exported goods that is Ricardian. 
Thus the foreign economy produces an export that has a common price for all the home 






where ι denotes a vector of ones and the subscript denotes that it has the number of 
elements of either the vector p or the vector m. This assumption ensures that on the 
supply side the aggregation is consistent. 
Next, we impose separability within the CES aggregators  so that 
P(p,h) = P[φ(p),h] where φ(p) is a lower level CES aggregator for the final goods 
imports. Similarly, C(m,w) = C[μ(m),w] where μ(m) is a CES aggregator for imported 









Separability also lets us simplify in the balance of trade constraint to  
  Pu −Tp
aP φφu −Tm
aCμμz − wL = b , 
where the a superscript denotes the trade weighted average tariff within the group. We 
can solve for real income directly as 







The aggregation scheme allows us to substitute for the price vectors (p,m) that 
have dimension in the thousands the scalar true average tariffs and the scalar world prices 
that have dimension 4 and the trade weighted average tariffs that have dimension 2. 
Now consider closing the world model. The foreign economy is modeled in 
exactly parallel fashion, with all variables denoted as foreign with a *. For consistency, 
b + b
* = 0. The world markets for traded goods clear.  
The subtlety with aggregation is that, while Shephard’s Lemma combined with 
separability allows us to define natural volumes, these are in different units when the 
prices are different. This leads to a conversion for consistency. Markets clear according 
to 






















*δ . (1.5) 
On the right hand side is the demand for home export goods generated by final 
demand and by intermediate demand, with the ratio of the tariff indexes serving to 
change units for consistency. On the left hand side is the supply of home export goods. 
An analogous expression obtains for market clearance for the export of the foreign 














δ . (1.6) 
Equations (1.5)-(1.6) combine with equations (1.1)-(1.4) and the analogous 
equation subsystem for the foreign economy to make a 10 equation system to determine   5
the world prices (r,r




*). Homogeneity of degree zero 
implies that one price can be set equal to one. It is natural to normalize on the home wage 
rate or the foreign price of exports.  
Implementation 
Take the 1991 India data set utilized in Anderson and Neary (2005). Compute the 
ROW data for construction of ROW by taking the 1991 World Development Report 
totals. Adjust the export totals for ROW to match the imports of India and similarly 
adjust the import totals of ROW to match the export totals of India. For tariffs in ROW, 
assume some reasonable uniform tariffs, for example 5%.  
In this model there are 4 markets to clear, ultimately. There is a nontraded good 
market for each country and there is a world market for the export of each country.  
 
Details of Implementation 
Data for India 
GDP is the sum of payments to factors located domestically. This is wL  in terms 
of the theory. Then ηz = wL + μCμ . The second term is the sum of the intermediate 
imports evaluated at domestic prices. So, the left hand side can be benchmarked with data 
available from the WDR. The value of exports is equal to ηrr . So the value of nontraded 
production is equal to wL + μCμ −ηrr = GDP + INTIMPORTS − EXPORTS.  
These data are used to form initial shares, which together with elasticity 
assumptions are used to create the CES/CET price indexes η(h,r),C(μ,w).  
Expenditure is equal, by the balance of trade condition, to GDP+Tariff 
Revenue+Net Transfers. Expenditure is split between FINALIMPORTS and nontraded 
goods. Thus nontraded goods expenditure is equal to 
GDP+Tariff_Revenue+Net_Transfers-FINALIMPORTS. The nontraded expenditure 
share and the final imports expenditure share can be drawn from these data. Then an 
elasticity assumption permits us to create the true cost of living index P(φ,h).   6
The sub-expenditure price index φ  and sub-cost function price index μ(m) can 
be created from the detailed trade flow data just as in the earlier spreadsheet model, 
implementing details laid out in my earlier notes. 
The India data for 1991 has about 1200 tariff lines at 4 digit HS level. These are 
divided into roughly half intermediates and half final goods. The GDP, Exports and 
current account balance data are taken from the WDR. A two level CES structure is used 
in calculating true average tariff aggregators, with a lower level elasticity being the key 
parameter in aggregation.  
Data for ROW 
ROW GDP is obtained from WDR data. The ROW exports are set equal to India's 
total imports. The net transfer is set equal to the India net transfer times minus one. 
The split between final an intermediate import usage in the ROW is problematic. 
The simulation uses the India shares. 
Tariffs for ROW: Since most of the world’s GDP is produced by low average 
tariff rich countries, a low uniform tariff of 5% is utilized. This misses important aspects 
of tariff structure in rich countries, but the errors here are unlikely to affect the main 
object of the analysis: the bias due to inconsistent aggregation. 
 
 Appendix. Illustrative Simulations 
(Not for publication  
A tightly specified smaller scale model reveals the underpinnings of why 
consistent aggregation matters. The simulation aggregates a set of 5 tariffs that range 
from 3% to 150%, with the largest tariffs falling on the goods with heaviest weight in the 
sub-expenditure function. This tariff structure resembles apparel and agriculture 
protection in a number of countries. At the upper level of the model, preferences are 
Cobb-Douglas, with 25% of expenditure falling on the aggregated good. There is another 
tariff-ridden good accounting for 25% of expenditure, paying a 10% tariff . The 
remaining 50% of expenditure is not taxed.  
All the consumption goods in the economy are imported (an extreme but 
inessentially simple assumption). The production of the economy is sold to foreigners, 
with proceeds that pay for imports. The  set up is a two country general equilibrium 
model.  The tariff-ridden traded goods (both the consumption aggregate and the other 
tariffed good) are perfect substitutes on the supply side. This can be rationalized for 
example by Ricardian technology. The tariffed and non-taxed goods are not substitutable 
at all on the supply side, effectively constrained by endowments.  
The initial tariffs (on the world price base) and their distribution weights in the 
group to be aggregated are given in Table A.1. below. 








The elasticity of substitution is set equal to 5, which is on the low side of elasticities 
found from gravity type models of bilateral trade. These parameters and the CES form 
result in the home country tariff indexes given in the first line of Table A.2.   2
  The home and foreign country are each assumed to have an endowment of 50 for 
the non-taxed good and an endowment of 50 for the tariff-ridden goods. The foreign 
economy has a uniform 5% tariff (on the world price base) on the aggregated sector and a 
10% tariff on the other tariffed sector. The model is solved for the world prices of the 
four goods (the non-taxed good in each country and the aggregate tariffed good on the 
supply side.) Homogeneity of degree zero of the world excess demand system implies 
that one of the prices may be set at unity. 






























































*W − z = 0.
 
The first two equations make use of the balance of trade equation to solve for 
nominal expenditure. The last four equations express market clearance in the (effectively) 




*W ). Real incomes are obtained by deflating 
the equilibrium expenditures (e,e















 for the home economy and similarly for the 
foreign economy. 
Solving for equilibrium with the parameter values given above yields the 
equilibrium real income listed for the home country in the second line of Table A.2. The 
real incomes implied by pretending that the trade weighted or the true average tariff is 
correct are listed in columns two and three, while column four presents the correct real 
income calculation.   3
 
Table A. 2 Home Country Sectoral Tariffs and Real Income 
 Trade  Weighted 
Average 
True Average  TRI Uniform Tariff 
Tariff Index  .434  .519  .608 
Real Income  98.62  97.54  94.69 
 
These results imply a large amount of bias, amounting to over 4% of real income in the 
case where the trade weighted average tariff is used as if it were the right tariff (the 
difference between column 2 and column 4 as a proportion of column 4).
17 In the present 
model, the welfare cost from protection amounts to 5.5%, so the bias is about 75% of the 
true welfare cost. Alternatively, measuring welfare costs properly more than triples the 
welfare cost obtained when treating the tariff using the trade weighted average. Similar 
bias results from using the true average tariff as if it were the proper tariff: the consistent 
procedure more than doubles the welfare cost estimate.  
  Dispersion matters a lot in driving differences between the trade weighted average 
tariff and the other two. Indeed, the trade weighted coefficient of variation of the tariff 
schedule is 0.71. The influence of dispersion on the bias due to using atheoretic average 
tariffs can be traced conveniently with an experiment that shrinks tariff dispersion while 
preserving the arithmetic mean: T




∑ /n + (1− λ)T
0  where ι is the vector of 
ones, λ ∈[0,1] and the initial tariff vector is T
0 . (Because the weights in the trade 
weighted average tariff change, it is difficult to specify a mean preserving cut in 
dispersion using T
a  as the mean.)  The chart below shows the effect of dispersion cuts of 
this type on the trade weighted average tariff, the TRI uniform tariff (calculated using 
(2.3)) and the relative bias in real income. Dispersion is decreased in 10% mean-
preserving steps. On the right, all dispersion is wrung out. Even with less than half the 
initial dispersion, the bias is still quite significant. 
                                                 
17 The units in which real income is measured are unimportant; what matters is the 
bias, a big number by the usual standards of welfare loss from protection.   4












Trade Weighted Average Tariff
 
  The dispersion reduction experiment lowers the TRI uniform tariff monotonically, 
as it does the true average tariff (not plotted), but it first raises and then lowers the trade 
weighted average tariff, due to the complex nonlinearity of the trade weights.  
Real income rises monotonically with the  arithmetic mean preserving dispersion 
cuts, increasing in total by around 5%. The total real income change can be decomposed 
into two parts: the effect of the tariff changes at constant world prices and the terms of 
trade effect of the change in world prices. The decomposition is based on the reduced 
form formula for real income: 


























The first ratio on the right collects the direct tariff effects. The second term collects the  
terms of trade effects. The collapse of dispersion and the reduction in the trade weighted 
average tariff combine to worsen the terms of trade of the reforming country, costing it an 
additional 6.2% of real income.  
The simulation results illustrate that dispersion reduction can confer a secondary 
benefit to a large country through a terms of trade improvement. As Anderson and Neary 
(2005) have shown, the trade volume (and hence the terms of trade) implications of 
generalized variance reduction and of generalized mean tariff reduction run in opposite 
directions. In the CES case, the generalized mean is the trade weighted average while the   5
generalized variance is the trade weighted variance divided by the share of expenditure 
on other goods. The decomposition of the real income changes over the interval of 
arithmetic-mean-preserving contractions of dispersion reveals that the terms of trade 
effects are at first positive and only later become significantly negative. The arithmetic-
mean preserving tariff dispersion cut rule interacts with the structure of demand in this 
model such that the reform at first lowers trade volume and thereby improves the terms of 
trade. This arises because the generalized dispersion cut at first raises the generalized 
mean, as Chart 1 shows. Eventually the dispersion cut becomes less important than the 
mean cut to trade volume and the terms of trade are harmed by the trade reform.  
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